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LIGHTS, CAMERA, ANIMATE!
In the 1981 film Looker,' writer/director Michael Crichton
provided us with a glimpse into the future-a future he never thought
would actually exist:
Cindy was the perfect model. She was leggy and
exquisite with liquid blue eyes. Digital Matrix, a futuristic
advertising agency, sought her out and convinced her to allow
them to scan her image for reproduction.
Cindy slowly rotated within a steel cylinder, her naked
body laced with thin rays of light, while her image was
graphed and scanned into a computer.
A representative of Digital Matrix dryly explained to
Cindy's skeptical on-looking friend:'
"We can now make commercials entirely by computer
with no live actors at all once the model is made. Computers
animate the images, dress them, and provide voices."
"Really?"
"The computer is constructing this three dimensional
duplicate from the data base. We can provide the kind of
improvements we once did through surgery."3
In reference to reality, Michael Crichton admitted that initially
he thought computerizing live models for television would never be
possible.4 "'Then we found a company ... that is doing just that.
The difference is that their computer models are not nearly as
animated as ours. But how long before they catch up to our movie?'5
A decade and a half later, "[w]elcome to the brave new world of
digital animation, a world where humans can behave like cartoons and
cartoons can seem human.",
6
I. INTRODUCrION
Technology is on the verge of realistically providing filmmakers
with the option of employing an actor's computer-generated likeness
1. LOOKER (Warner Bros. 1981). Looker is a high-tech thriller which features a
sophisticated computer which photographs and measures humans in order to create an
exact animated duplicate. The computer-generated likenesses are then used in television
commercials. Id.
2. Id. (describing scene in film).
3. Id. (quoting dialogue from scene in film).
4. LOOKER (Warner Home Video 1982) (quoting Michael Crichton's comment on
video jacket).
5. Id.
6. Tom Soter, Brave New World, SHOOT, Jan. 28, 1994, at 28, 28.
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in a film, rather than hiring the live actor.7 This process is referred
to as "reanimation." 8
Why might this be an appealing option for filmmakers? Imagine
Arnold Schwarzenegger turning in an Academy-Award-winning
performance; or Marilyn Monroe baring all in a steamy X-rated romp
with Brad Pitt;9 or Katherine Hepburn twenty years younger; or a
slender Shelly Winters; or Clint Eastwood in drag, complete with a
feather boa and a wig. 0 Whatever the reason, it is an uncontrovert-
ed temptation and the entertainment industry awaits with baited
breath for the technological ability to employ an animated cast."
7. See Frederick Rose, Who Needs Actors?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1995, at R8
(describing potential practice of creating original animated thespians that will ultimately
replace human actors); see also David Blum, Stardate 2005, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1995,
at R12 (hypothesizing futuristic replacement of actors with computer technology); Chris
Koseluck, Digital Acting, SCREEN AcrOR, Mar. 1995, at 32, 32-33 (describing effect of
computer animation on actors' job security); Richard Reynolds, Electronic Movie Stars,
MACLEAN'S, Mar. 28, 1988, at 56, 56 (describing reanimation of deceased actors); Soter,
supra note 6, at 28 (describing available software enabling creation of cartoons that appear
to be human).
8. For the purposes of this Comment, reanimation refers to the process whereby a
computerized animated version of a celebrity is created and so closely resembles the actual
celebrity that the two are visually indistinguishable. See supra note 7 and accompanying
text.
9. "What if studio execs, already drooling over recasting the most bankable actors
in history, want to put Marilyn in an X-rated flick?" Linda Himelstein, Studio Back Lot
of the Living Dead, Bus. WK., Dec. 6, 1993, at 6, 6.
10. An ad featuring John Wayne in drag was the California legislature's impetus for
extending celebrities' right of publicity even after a celebrity's death, providing post-
mortem protection for 50 years. Ud; see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1995).
Although an advertisement featuring Wayne in drag would now clearly be a violation of
California Civil Code § 990, it may not be a violation to feature him in a dramatic film
clad in heels and a wig. See infra part III.B.2 (describing application of the right of
publicity).
11. See Rose, supra note 7, at R8. "'The digital spokesman of tomorrow can have the
body of Arnold Schwarzenegger, the voice of Brando, and the face of James Dean-and
look real.'" Soter, supra note 6, at 28 (quoting Mark Dippe, visual effects supervisor at
Industrial Light and Magic (ILM)). "[Flor moviemakers, the prospect of creating stars
who take direction willingly... has unquestionable appeal." Reynolds, supra note 7, at
56 (describing Hollywood's desire to create animated movie stars).
Some will argue, however, that "[t]he spark of humanity, the spark of life just can't
be emulated or synthesized by even the most advanced piece of software." Koseluck,
supra note 7, at 33 (quoting Michael A. Prohaska, Screen Actors Guild Interactive Media
Contracts Administrator). Even if technology provides the film industry with digitally-
animated perfection, some claim that "computers will never get to the point of replacing
actors." Id (citing Dennis Muran, Industrial Light & Magic's senior visual effects
supervisor). Actor Joe Nipote claims that humans will never want to watch digitalized





Given that it is both possible and desirable, the question remains:
Is it legal to reanimate a live celebrity without that celebrity's consent,
and star the celebrity's computerized clone in a narrative"2 film? 3
" '"People tend to overestimate what can be done in one year
and to underestimate what can be done in five or ten years."' 14
Soon, we will not be able to visually distinguish between reality and
animation. "In the past, the legal system has reacted to, rather than
anticipated, [technological] innovation; witness the introduction of the
motion picture, television, cable, VCR, and the pre-recorded
videocassette .... It is not too soon to begin a discussion of the legal
issues raised by reanimation."'5
To illustrate the potential dilemma, imagine that technology has
provided the filmmaker with the cost-efficient and precise ability to
exercise total control over an animated cast. 6 Rather than create an
original animated thespian, however, the filmmaker chooses to use an
animated version of a celebrity who exists in reality.7 So without
consent the filmmaker employs the likeness of Sylvester Stallone in
a film as a sympathetic psychologist with a prevalent feminine side, a
mustache, and a bald spot.
This seems an obvious infringement of some inherent right of the
celebrity."8 A grey area in the law exists, however, which invites the
12. A narrative is a story, account, or tale. WEBSTER'S NEw UNIVERSAL UN-
ABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1984). It is the art or practice of relating stories or ac-
counts-narration. Id. This Comment deals with a reanimation in the context of a
narrative film as opposed to a documentary.
13. Notably, Professor Joseph J. Beard concluded, in a recent article, that it is legally
permissible in some instances to reanimate a deceased celebrity without the celebrity's
consent. Joseph J. Beard, Casting Call at Forest Lawn: The Digital Resurrection of
Deceased Entertainers-A 21st Century Challenge for Intellectual Property Law, 8 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 101 (1993).
14. Id. at 105 (quoting J.C.R. LICKLIDER, LIBRARIES OF THE FUTURE 17 (1965)
(quoting an unspecified source)).
15. Beard, supra note 13, at 106 (footnotes omitted) (calling for discussion of legal
ramifications regarding reanimating deceased celebrities).
16. See infra part I.B (delineating feasibility and desirability of reanimation).
17. Filmmakers operate under the assumption that if a film features a prominent star,
the film will enjoy box office success. DAVID F. PRINDLE, THE POLITICS OF GLAMOUR
13 (1988).
18. In fact, contrary to this Comment's conclusion, Professor Beard concludes
emphatically that to reanimate a live actor would violate the right of publicity in "virtually
every jurisdiction." Beard, supra note 13, at 108 n.29.
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disconcerting conclusion that such a use may be, in fact, legally
permissible.
Depending on the interpretation and application of the doctrine
which addresses the reanimation issue, such a use may not be a
violation at all. This Comment establishes first that there is ambiguity
regarding the outcome. Born out of this ambiguity is the need for
clarity in the form of legislation. It would be easy to suggest that a
doctrine already in existence-the right of publicity-should be
stretched to cover and preclude this activity. Although courts are
likely to exercise this option, this Comment asserts that to do so
would be an affront to the policy goals behind the right of publicity
and other existing doctrines, and it would perpetuate existing
problems.
In short, this Comment will illustrate the state of technology with
regard to reanimation, 9 and then identify and define the legal doc-
trine which most appropriately addresses whether reanimating a
celebrity is legally permissible-the rightof publicity'2 It will then
articulate the complicated and unpredictable application of the right
of publicity." Additionally, it will discuss the possibility and criticize
the consequences of each potential outcome-that the law either
precludes or permits reanimation for the purpose of a narrative
film.' Finally, it will propose a legislative solution which operates
as a compromise between the two alternative outcomes contemplated
above.23
B. State of Technology
Computer-generated imagery (CGI) "is fundamentally changing
the viewing and making of movies, in ways both intriguing and a little
scary."'24 CGI is predominately used to alter existing footage. "It's
basically a process that digitally breaks down and reorganizes images
by computer, painting a limitless variety of 'visual lies.' "" For
example, in Forrest Gump,26 CGI enabled Tom Hanks to speak to
19. See infra part I.B.
20. See infra part II.
21. See infra part III.
22. See infra part IV.
23. See infra part V.
24. Jeffery Wells, You Ought to Be in Pixels!; Computer Images Are Changing
Filmmaking, DALLAS MORNING NEws, July 23, 1994, at 5C.
25. Id
26. FORREST GuMP (Paramount Pictures 1994).
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or rub elbows with Presidents Nixon, Kennedy, and Johnson.2 This
was achieved by blending newsreel footage with newly shot film,
utilizing several forms of computerized "masking, tweaking and
refining."' Tippett Studios used CGI technology in Jurassic Park2 9
to give the mechanical dinosaurs an "airbrush[ed] look-a certain
level of slickness."3
Although CGI has been criticized for appearing hollow,31 this
form of technology, which is admittedly in its infancy, is already, in
some cases, undetectable.32 For instance, in Forrest Gump, co-star
Gary Sinise plays a double amputee whose legs actually appear to be
missing. It is precisely this undetectable characteristic of CGI effects
that "is giving some people the willies."'33
"'We've opened up a whole can of worms,"' Ken Ralston,
Forrest Gump special effects chief, warns.34 It seems inevitable that,
rather than altering existing performances, CGI will be used to create
"synthespians,"3 capable of entire dramatic performances?6 Com-
puter graphic research is currently in progress to address such issues
as facial modeling, skin texture and hair modeling, emotion genera-
tion, and synchronization of voice and motion.37 "'Once in a while,
a holy grail appears in this business.., and right now that holy grail
is the digital actor.' ,38
As early as 1987, Daniel and Nadia Thalmann, who teach
computer science at the University of Montreal, devised a computer
program entitled the "Human Factory," which provided a new level
27. Wells, supra note 24, at 5C.
28. ld
29. JuRAssic PARK (Universal Pictures 1993).
30. Wells, supra note 24, at 6C.
31. Id. (quoting Phil Tippett of Tippett Studios); see also Rose, supra note 7, at R8
(describing skepticism in entertainment industry about the potential of reanimation).
32. Wells, supra note 24, at 6C.
33. Wells, supra note 24, at 6C.
34. Id
35. Rose, supra note 7, at R8 (defining computer-animated actors as "synthespians").
36. Mark Dippe, a special effects wizard at ILM and a principal developer of the
software system used in Jurassic Park, warns that "[t]he next big leap you're going to see
is that the dramatic lead, the hero figure, the love interest, whatever, are going to be
digital." Koseluck, supra note 7, at 32. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 56; see also Wells,
supra note 24, 5C. This inevitability has been acknowledged by Joseph Beard. See
generally Beard, supra note 13 (discussing legal effect of reanimating dead actors).
37. Beard, supra note 13, at 104-05 (footnotes omitted); see also Rose, supra note 7,
at R8.
38. Rose, supra note 7, at R8 (quoting Richard Edlund, president of Boss Film
Studio).
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of realism. 9  With this program, they created a seven-minute
simulated live-action film starring computer-generated likenesses of
Humphrey Bogart and Marilyn Monroe entitled Rendez-Vous J
Montrgal. The Thalmanns used the film to introduce the potential of
computer animation.' "The film was dramatic evidence of on-going
attempts to create realistic, computer-generated synthetic actors."
41
Although the film was a crude simulation of reality, it was sophisticat-
ed enough to illustrate that it will not be long before it is possible to
produce a film starring a nonexistent, computer-generated cast.
42
However, Humphrey Bogart's estate threatened legal action if the
Thalmanns used the film for commercial gain. However, because the
Thalmanns did not exploit the film for commercial gain, no action was
ever taken.43 "Before long, Hollywood could be under siege by CGI
pirates, with the images of dead actors and actresses being ripped of
willy-nilly."44
Stemming logically from this scenario is the assumption that it
will be possible to reanimate actors who are not only deceased, but
also those very much alive.45 Only by analogy is it possible to
anticipate which body of law will address this issue. Although
trademark and copyright law are both implicated and therefore must
be evaluated, neither can be applied in a satisfactory manner. On the
other hand, the right of publicity-a celebrity's right to control and
profit from her own persona-will undoubtedly be applied to the
issue; however, the outcome of such an application is uncertain.
39. Reynolds, supra note 7, at 56.
40. l t To make the film, the Thalmanns used films and photographs as references,
creating plaster sculptures of the actors' key features, including faces and hands. Id. Then
they divided the sculptures into hundreds of tiny "facets." Id A hand-held scanner was
used to read all the facets and feed the information into a computer. This process is called
"mapping." Id. Using computer commands, the figures are able to speak and move.
Daniel Thalmann anticipated that more advanced versions of his program would not
require the three-dimensional model. Id. He predicted that an animator would feed in
data directly from photographs or, in the case of an original character, from a computer-
ized catalogue of features. Id
41. Beard, supra note 13, at 104.
42. Ida at 105.
43. Reynolds, supra note 7, at 56. Regarding the threatened action, specific allegations
were never articulated. Id Lawyers representing Bogart's estate were considering suing
the video's distributor because the actor's likeness was used without permission; however,
they were unable to cite specific law which would preclude the activity. Id.
44. Wells, supra note 24, at 5C.
45. Koseluck, supra note 7, at 33 (illustrating Hollywood's desire to digitally clone





Copyright law protects original works, that are fixed in a tangible
medium, from duplication or imitation.' However it does not
protect a person's voice or image because such an asset is not
considered an original work that is fixed in a tangible medium.
Copyright law, therefore, does not protect a celebrity from having her
image duplicated and exploited. The law of copyright, in fact,
condones imitation.47
Although the cloning of personalities is not precluded by
copyright law, the issue of copyright is implicated with respect to the
creation of the clone.4' To create a realistic replica of a celebrity,
the reanimator49 will require reference works.5 0 Where these
reference works enjoy their own copyright protection, "issues arise as
to whether, and to what extent, the reanimator may use these
reference works without license."'" The owner of a copyright of a
reference work retains the exclusive right to permit or prevent the use
of her works to create derivative works, 2 including a computer
46. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) ("Copyright protection subsists, in
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.").
47. Id § 114 (historical and revision notes). Specifically, voice-alikes are expressly
permitted. Id § 114(b) (stating that laws of copyright do not protect against "sounds
[which] imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording").
48. After a computer program is created it becomes fixed and thus subject to rules of
copyright and worthy of receiving copyright protection itself. 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
COUNSELING AND LITIGATION § 11.03[2][a] (Lester Horwitz et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY].
49. For the purpose of this Comment, the reanimator is the computer programmer,
producer, studio, or other party responsible for the creation of the computer program that
will generate the celebrity's image. See generally Beard, supra note 13 (referring to the
process of creating a computer-animated clone of a particular person as "reanimation").
50. The reference works-for example, photographs of the celebrity-will be used to
create the computer program which will generate the celebrity's animated image. See
supra note 40 and accompanying text.
51. Beard, supra note 13, at 106.
52. Under the copyright law, a derivative work is
a work based on a pre-existing work, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
fictionalization, motion picture version, abridgment or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed or adapted, is a derivative work. Only the
holder of copyright in the underlying work (or one acting with his permission)
may prepare a derivative work. The preparation of such a work by any other
January 1996]
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program. It is also possible that the owner of the copyright of the
reference work will be the same person or entity seeking to create the
derivative work-the computer program. For example, the studio
may be using photographs or frames from a film over which the
studio already has control of the copyright. 4 It is possible, however,
that a license from the copyright owner of the reference work will
have to be obtained. "If the reanimator does not exploit any of these
rights in recreating the deceased actor, then no infringement can be
successfully claimed.""5
Further, if the reference work used is unprotected by copyright,
its use in the creation of a computer program is of no consequence.
For instance, the work may be in the public domain, 6 in which case
its use is not violative. It is also possible that the reference work may
be a photograph or video tape, for example, obtained for the
purposes of reanimation without violating any rights.
57
To summarize, it is possible to create a reanimated person
without violating any copyright owner's rights.
58
B. Federal and State Unfair Competition
1. Federal unfair competition including trademark
A federal unfair competition provision exists in the Lanham
Act.59 Federal trademark infringement is one type of unfair compe-
tition.' "There is ... a fundamental distinction ... between trade-
party constitutes infringement. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 101.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (6th ed. 1990).
53. The copyright owner of a particular work-a photograph, for example-controls
the exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, public performance, and display of the
work, as well as the right to create a derivative work incorporating in whole or in part the
underlying copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106.
54. For instance, the studio may have photographs or frames of film from its own films
in which the celebrity has previously starred.
55. Beard, supra note 13, at 109.
56. Works-such as writings, documents, publications, films, and photographs-which
are not protected by copyright, are in the "public domain" and available for use without
permission. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1229 (6th ed. 1990); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101
(historical and revision notes).
57. See, eg., Koseluck, supra note 7, at 32 (describing process of filming performer and
using footage to create computer-generated character with human attributes).
58. See Beard, supra note 13.
59. Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
60. Id. § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114; see also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1.05 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCARTHY,
[Vol. 29:863
J LIGHTS, CAMERA, ANIMATE!
mark infringement and unfair competition," the essence of which is
that the doctrine of unfair competition offers broader protection than
trademark law.6t However, the underlying concern is similar: Each
doctrine exists to preclude profiteering by deceiving the purchaser,
consumer, or viewer.61 "It is well settled that the crucial determinant
in an action for trademark infringement or unfair competition is
'whether there is any likelihood that an appreciable number of
ordinarily prudent [people] are likely to be misled, or indeed simply
confused ... . "63 In light of this crucial similarity, for the purposes
of this discussion, these Lanham Act& doctrines are evaluated
concurrently.
The Lanham Act can be construed to protect a celebrity from the
exploitation of his or her likeness in a motion picture where the goal
is not to sell a collateral product,65 but merely to entertain.66 It is
TRADEMARKS].
61. Parameter Driven Software v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 25 F.3d 332, 337 (6th
Cir. 1994).
62. Trademark infringement is the "unauthorized use, or colorable imitation of the
mark already appropriated by another, on goods of a similar class .... It exists if words
or designs used by defendant are identical with or so similar to plaintiff's that they are
likely to cause confusion, or deceive or mislead others." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 781
(6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Unfair competition is "applied generally to all dishonest or fraudulent rivalry in trade
and commerce." Id. at 1528. For example, an "imitation... carried far enough to mislead
the general public or deceive [the] unwary purchaser, and yet not amounting to an absolute
counterfeit or to the infringement of a trademark." Id. (emphasis added).
63. Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 584 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Mushroom
Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (citation
omitted), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1116 (1979)).
64. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
65. A "collateral" product in this context means a product which is not, itself, the
work in which the likeness is exploited.
66. Although § 43(a) of the Lanham Act primarily relates to federally registered
trademarks, liability under § 43(a) may also arise for a false description or representation
even though no actual trademark is involved. See Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F.
Supp. 1288, 1294 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., 595
F.2d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that registration of trademark is not necessary for
recovery); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 393, 408 (N.D. 111. 1979) (stating
that misrepresentations "need not involve a trademark" (citation omitted)). Celebrity
personas are protected under the Lanham Act to the extent that the Act "explicitly
condemns false designation or representations in connection with 'any goods or services'
Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981) (quote not cited); see, e.g., Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.), affd,
604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
"[T]he names of movie actors and other performers may, under certain circumstances,
be registered under the Lanham Act as service marks for entertainment services.. . , [but
this] is not a prerequisite for recovery under section 43(a)." Smith, 648 F.2d at 605
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an elastic statute that has been touted as "encompass[ing] any form
of competition or selling which contravenes society's current concepts
of 'fairness."' 67 The Ninth Circuit noted that the Lanham Act may
be given a "'broad construction'" and regarded it as a "'remedial
kind of statute.'"6 "[T]here is no part of the law which is more
plastic than unfair competition, and what was not reckoned an
actionable wrong 25 years ago may have become such today., 69
Therefore, it is possible to stretch the doctrine to preclude the use of
a celebrity's reanimated likeness in a narrative film.
However, the original intent of the Lanham Act was merely to
prevent consumer confusion; thus, it has been applied primarily in
commercial settings." Where the alleged misuse is in the context of
an entertainment narrative rather than an advertisement, the concern
remains the same. For example, although the focus in Smith v.
Montoro7t was misuse of names" in the context of a feature film
rather than a commercial, the court was concerned that the viewer of
the film, rather than the purchaser of a product, would be "deceived
into believing that [the film] comes from a different source."
73
Similarly, where the trademarked uniforms of the Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders were used in a pornographic feature film, the court
(citation omitted) (footnote omitted). Section 45 of the Lanham Act defines "service
mark" as "a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the services of one
person and distinguish them from the services of others." Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(e)(3), (f).
67. Smith, 648 F.2d at 604 (quoting 1 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 60,
§ 25.1).
68. Id. at 603 (quoting district judge from May 1, 1978 proceedings in same matter).
69. Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925) (L. Hand,
J.), rev'd on other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927).
70. The Ninth Circuit expressed that "'the Lanham Act is limited in its scope and
intent to merchandising practices in the nature of, or economically equivalent to, palming
off one's goods as goods of a competitor, and/or misuse of trademarks and trade names."
Smith, 648 F.2d at 603 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
71. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
72. Paul Smith contracted to star in a film ultimately distributed by defendants. Id.
at 602. Smith was supposed to receive star billing in the screen credits and advertising, but
another actor's name was substituted in place of Smith's name. Id. The court considered
this "reverse passing off" and, thus, constituted a § 43(a) claim. Id. at 605.
Reverse passing off is accomplished "expressly" when the wrongdoer removes
the name or trademark on another party's product and sells that product under
a name chosen by the wrongdoer.. .. "Implied" reverse passing off occurs when
the wrongdoer simply removes or otherwise obliterates the name of the
manufacturer or source and sells the product in an unbranded state.
Id. (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 607 (citation omitted).
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found that there was a violation, reasoning that it was possible for
viewers to believe that the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders endorsed the
production of the film.74 Additionally, in Newton v. Thomason75
the court found no likelihood of confusion where Wood Newton, a
country/western celebrity, alleged unfair competition because the main
character of "Evening Shade" was also named Wood Newton.76 The
court reasoned that, despite the similarity in name, enough differences
existed between the character and the actual Wood Newton so that
the viewer would not be misled into believing that the country star
had any connection to the television series.77
These holdings are consistent with the trademark infringement
concerns that arise in the context of commercials. More importantly,
these cases suggest that no violation exists if no confusion surrounds
the celebrity's identity.78 In other words, if the viewer was deceived
into believing that the animated likeness of a celebrity was, in fact,
the actual celebrity, then there would be a clear violation; however,
if the on-screen persona was properly credited as an animated version
of the personality it resembles, then no violation would exist.79
2. State common-law unfair competition
Often, common-law unfair competition claims at the state level
will be applied in much the same way as at the federal level-the
concern being that there is no likelihood of confusion on the part of
the buying or viewing public.80 In order to find unfair competition,
74. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 467 F. Supp. at 376-77.
75. 22 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1994).
76. Il at 1461-62.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., id. at 1462; White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th
Cir. 1992), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
79. See John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 313 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
modified, 587 F.2d 602, and aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp.,
587 F.2d 602,603-04 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that imitation of master model of building was
not Lanham Act violation, but advertising it as authentic reproduction of a building rather
than a reproduction of original model was a violation; suggesting that had proper credit
been given, no violation would have been found).
Furthermore, where the likeness is used in order to promote the film, it must be made
clear that the film stars the reanimated version of the celebrity rather than the celebrity
herself.
80. See, e.g., Cesare v. Work, 520 N.E.2d 586, 590 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (looking to
federal guidance on issues covered by Ohio statute); see also Carson v. Here's Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating the "likelihood of
confusion" standard applies to both § 43(a) and Michigan common law) (citations
omitted).
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courts may require evidence that customers purchased tickets to a film
starring an animated likeness of a celebrity based on the mistaken
belief that they had purchased tickets to view the actual celebrity. t
Again, however, a disclaimer would eliminate the likelihood of
confusion.82 Unfair competition, however, is in part a common-law
doctrine; it is thus sometimes expansively and protectively applied. 3
Therefore, courts may find a violation based on grounds other than
public confusion.'
In sum, copyright is an inappropriate doctrine to apply to the
reanimation issue, and unfair competition, including trademark law,
will not likely offer protection either.85 The right of publicity,
however, looms as a large protective umbrella over the issue and
threatens to shield the celebrity from harm at the expense of First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.86
III. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity offers protection over a celebrity's
intangible asset-her persona, often referred to as name, voice, or
81. See Cesare, 520 N.E.2d at 590.
82. See i
83. Id. at 596.
84. See infra note 275.
85. Also note that the Uniform Single Publication Act forces, in some cases, the
reliance upon only one cause of action for relief, which further demonstrates the
impotence of any optional causes of action found under copyright, unfair competition, or
trademark law. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3425.3 (West 1970). The Uniform Single Publica-
tion Act bars persons from bringing more than one cause of action for damages for an
infringement of the right of publicity "founded upon any single publication or exhibition
or utterance." Id. (providing in relevant part: "No person shall have more than one cause
of action for damages for libel or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded
upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance, such as any one issue of a
newspaper or book or magazine or any one presentation to an audience or any one
broadcast over radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion picture."); see also
Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 756 & n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (recognizing right of
publicity as "any other tort"). When applying California law or the law of jurisdictions
which have a similar standard, the court must dismiss all but one claim. See, e.g., id at 756
(asserting that plaintiff's right of publicity claim may be considered but plaintiff's claims
for intrusion on seclusion, trespass, unfair competition, fraud, and intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed to extent that claims rely on actual
broadcast of program at issue). Thus, the above mentioned potential causes of action
along with other attenuated possibilities will not likely be viable because the right of
publicity is the most appropriate cause of action. Id. at 753 (asserting "Appropriation of
Likeness for Commercial Purposes," based upon § 3344(a) of the California Civil Code,
as the appropriate cause of action).
86. See infra part III.
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likeness.' If a celebrity is reanimated, protection and vindication
will be sought under either the common-law right of publicity, the
statutory right of publicity, or a combination of both.88 However,
the purpose of the use will affect whether protection is available.8 9
In other words, where the animated clone of a particular celebrity is
employed in a narrative feature, the actual celebrity may receive
protection," but it is the nature of the use which afflicts the predic-
tion with uncertainty. 1
A. Definition: From Inception to Current State of Confusion
The right of publicity emerged from the unassignable right of
privacy in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.92 Prior
to this precedent-setting case, the New York Civil Rights Law had
provided for injunctive relief and damages for invasion of the "right
of publicity."93 The Second Circuit provided celebrities with a cause
of action against advertisers' unauthorized use of their photo-
graphg --a cause of action which had previously been considered
precluded by the First Amendment.95 The plaintiff, a chewing gum
vendor, made a contract with a baseball player providing for a
designated period of time in which plaintiff had the exclusive right to
use the player's photograph in connection with the sale of gum; the
player agreed not to grant any other gum manufacturer a similar right
during such time.96 The defendant, a competing gum manufacturer,
aware of the plaintiff's contract, deliberately induced the player to
authorize defendant's use of the player's photograph in connection
with the sales of defendant's gum.97 According to then-existing law,
the defendant committed no actionable wrong.9 However, the
87. See generally Nimmer, infra note 103 (referring throughout to right of publicity's
protection of name, likeness, and voice).
88. See infra part III.B.
89. See infra part III.B.
90. See infra part III.B.
91. See infra part III.C.
92. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
93. Id. at 868 (referring to New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50, 51).
94. Id. at 868-69.
95. See generally 2 INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY, supra .note 48, § 28.05 (discussing
relationship between privacy rights and First Amendment). The First Amendment was
initially the right of publicity's most ominous obstacle, and it continues tobe the right of
publicity's nemesis. Id.
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majority asserted that the deprivation, which prominent persons
would suffer if they were unable to exclusively authorize the use of
their "countenances" for purposes of advertisements, justified
protection of such personality rights.99 The court noted:
[1]n addition to and independent of that right of privacy
(which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right
in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and
that such a grant may validly be made "in gross," i.e.,
without an accompanying transfer of a business or of
anything else. Whether it be labelled a "property" right is
immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag "property"
simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which
has pecuniary worth.
This right might be called a "right of publicity.' 1°°
The court acknowledged the existence of this right of publicity and
supported its assignability by distinguishing it from unassignable
privacy rights. 1
The disassociation of the distinctly economic interest in personali-
ty-the right to profit from celebrity status-from the privacy interest
in solitude-the right to be free from the public's prying eye-has
been the source of much confusion." z This separation was inevita-
ble considering the developing technology and the emerging forms of
entertainment which had enabled personalities to become widely
recognized-famous-prior to the invasion rather than because of the
invasion.0 3
99. l at 868.
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Id at 869. "[T]he right of privacy was 'purely personal and not assignable' because
'rights for outraged feelings are no more assignable than would be a claim arising from a
libelous utterance.'" Id. (citation omitted).
"The Haelan decision ... recognized the independent right of publicity by
differentiating that right from the already existing right of privacy." Sheldon W. Halpern,
The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality,
39 VAND. L. REv. 1199, 1203 (1986) (footnote omitted).
102. Halpern, supra note 101, at 1203. For an early discussion of the right of privacy,
see Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). In each case a vendor used a photograph of
a "theretofore private person" to advertise its product. Halpern, supra note 101, at 1203.
103. Professor Nimmer agreed with the distinction drawn and the resulting decision.
Seeing Haelan as predicated upon the separation of the celebrity's economic right from




"In general, the post-Haelan cases and commentary consistently
evidenced a movement toward recognition of the independent
right."1" "While virtually all states have some type of right of
privacy laws,... the right of publicity is still in search of a separate
identity.
') 10 5
[Although] Haelan and its progeny in the federal courts
in New York have been the principal support for the
doctrine [of] the right of publicity,... the doctrine... has
not been confined to New York; the Haelan formulation of
the right of publicity generally has been accepted, and, in the
course of the period of more than thirty years since Haelan
was decided, the doctrine has become more sophisticat-ed106
Currently, the right of publicity is understood to be a common-
law doctrine, codified in some jurisdictions."°7 Both the statutory
[The privacy concept] ... is not adequate to meet the demands of the second
half of the twentieth century .... With the tremendous strides in communica-
tions, advertising, and entertainment techniques, the public personality has found
that the use of his name, photograph, and likeness has taken on a pecuniary
value undreamed of at the turn of the century.
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203-04
(1954).
104. Halpern, supra note 101, at 1211.
105. Beard, supra note 13, at 146.
106. Halpern, supra note 101, at 1202 (footnotes omitted).
107. The right is directly protected by statute in fifteen states. Another sixteen
states recognize violations of the right of publicity under the rubric of misappro-
priation or as a form of invasion of privacy under common law. Moreover, a
right of publicity claim may also be based on § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 48, § 28.01 (footnotes omitted).
The history of the right of publicity in California is an illustration of common-law
codification: California has long recognized a common-law right of privacy, which provides
protection against four distinct categories of invasion.
These four distinct torts identified by Dean Prosser and grouped under the
privacy rubric are: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into
his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye;
and (4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or
likeness.
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 416, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (1983)
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
Section 3344(a) of the California Civil Code provides in pertinent part:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph,
or likeness, in any manner ... or for purposes of advertising or selling, or
soliciting purchases of products, merchandise, goods or services, without such
person's prior consent ... shall be liable for any damages sustained by the
person ... injured as a result thereof.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West Supp. 1995).
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and the common-law right may be asserted simultaneously, enabling
the common law to provide protection where the statute may not.",
Some jurisdictions have created a postmortem right, extending
protection of celebrity persona even after death."° However, "[t]his
amicable unanimity in defining the right is somewhat illusory... for
there is considerable disagreement about what the definition
means."
10
The interest in prohibiting unpermitted exploitation of celebrity
personas"' must be weighed against the First Amendment funda-
mental right to freedom of expression." 2 The right of publicity has
developed in light of this consideration, and it is this necessary
balancing that has contributed to the inconsistency and confusion
among decisions that are dictated by the right of publicity."3
Generally, the extent of protection provided by the right of
publicity is determined by a fact-intensive analysis."4 The decisions
made based on this fact-intensive approach indicate that a spectrum
108. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460,463 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth
Circuit found that although Midler's statutory right of publicity was not violated by the use
of a voice-alike in a commercial, her common-law right of publicity was violated, let The
court held that "when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and Is
deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not
theirs and have committed a tort in California." Id.
However, some states, New York for example, have held that the right of publicity
is solely a creature of statutes and that no independent common-law right may be asserted.
Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 1990); Stephano v. News Group
Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580,584 (N.Y. 1984); see also Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller
Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp 826, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (acknowledging that the common-law
and statutory right of publicity may be applied simultaneously).
109. Beard, supra note 13, at 147 (Nine states have passed post-mortem right of
publicity statutes: California, Florida, Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
Texas and Virginia). In four states, the law has been interpreted in either state or federal
court to include a postmortem common-law right of publicity. Id. The rationale behind
recognizing the right of publicity as an inheritable right is the fact that a persona may have
obtained value as a commodity during the life of the personality. Id. at 155-57.
Note that even where there is an established postmortem right of publicity, the
statutory application of the right of publicity is generally less protective when the
personality is deceased. Moreover, there is a time limit, which varies depending on the
jurisdiction, before the personality eventually falls into the public domain and their
likeness may be commercially exploited by anyone. See id.
110. Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real
People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1589-90 (1979).
111. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech."); see infra part IV.A.2.b (discussing First Amendment).
113. See infra part III.B.2.
114. See infra part III.B.2.
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has been created:"1 5 One end represents nonviolative appropriation
of a person's likeness, the other represents violative appropriation.
The nonviolative end of the spectrum represents the use of a
person's likeness in a biographical setting. Generally, the unautho-
rized use of one's name, likeness, or voice in a film about that person
or about some other historical incident to which that person has some
sort of a connection, is not a violation of the right of publicity
wherever the right is applied."6 The policy behind such a standard
is that the right to report the news or history supersedes the protec-
tion the individual has from exploitation." 7
However, the other end of the spectrum represents the most
offensive activity, and a clear violation of one's right of publici-
ty-appropriating one's name, likeness, or voice for commercial
purposes.' 8 For example, if one's persona is used to endorse a
vendor's product for the commercial gain of the vendor, then it is an
uncontroverted violation of the right of publicity."'
Based on the existence of this spectrum, with respect to names,
likeness, and -voice, determining what a judge will do in a situation
which represents either end of the spectrum is fairly obvious and
predictable.'" However, situations which fall in between are less
115. See 2 INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY, supra note 48, § 28.05; infra part III.B.2.
116. See infra part III.B.2.
117. Maritote v. Desilu Prods., 230 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1964), aff'd, 345 F.2d 418 (7th
Cir.), and cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965) (dealing with a movie about the late Al
Capone). Literary and cinemagraphic biographies are usually outside the right of privacy
on First Amendment grounds. See Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 272
P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1954).
The assumption is that the work is factually based and, as such, will not cause any
undeserved harm to an individual's reputation. Il at 183. Also, note that this does not
preclude a defamation cause of action if there is an injury to the person as a result of
untruths revealed in the biography. Id. at 182.
118. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1047 (1993); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983); Motschenbacher v. RJ.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d
256 (1st Cir. 1962); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, 472 N.Y.S2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984),
affd, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div. 1985); Commerce Union Bank v. Coors, 7 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2204 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), affd on other grounds, No. 83-327-11 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1987). "[These] cases are instructive of the courts' philosophy with respect to
advertising." Beard, supra note 13, at 159. In each of the above-listed cases, a violation
of the right of publicity was found where the persona, either in voice or likeness, was
appropriated without permission and used for the endorsement or sale of a product.
119. See, e.g., Waits, 978 F.2d 1093; White, 971 F.2d 1395; Midler, 849 F.2d 460.
120. See supra note 118 (listing relevant cases).
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predictable."' The reanimation of an actual actor to be used in a
fictional setting falls somewhere in the middle of the spectrum."
It is this confusion which begs the question: Does the right of
publicity preclude reanimation in the context of neither a commercial
nor news but rather a fictional, narrative feature film?
B. Application: Various Possible Approaches
For the purposes of applying the right of publicity doctrine to
assess whether the unauthorized exploitation of computer-generated
clones is a violation, assume the jurisdiction is one in which both inter
vivos and postmortem rights of publicity are afforded. There are a
couple of ways to approach the legal dilemma: Either apply a literal
reading of the statutes,"z or apply the law based on an interpreta-
tion of the convoluted cases which the past few decades have
provided.
The latter approach is the most challenging in that there are
several possible interpretations which spring from the cases-that,
according to case law, the right of publicity (1) precludes all unautho-
rized appropriation of likeness unless it is for use in a news-oriented
or historical context; 24 (2) allows all unauthorized appropriation of
likeness unless it is used to promote the sale of a collateral"z
product;"2 or (3) may preclude or allow unauthorized appropriation
of a personality's likeness depending on where upon the spectrum the
exploitative activity falls between advertising of a collateral product
and a biographical work about the personality."z Employing a
celebrity's animated clone in a narrative film is neither a purely
commercial use, nor a biographical or historical use; therefore,
depending on the interpretation of the law, the right of publicity may
not preclude such use.
121. 1 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 60, § 28.48 (discussing every possible
setting in which a celebrity's persona could be used-except dramatic, narrative
setting-and the legal ramifications for doing so)
122. See infra part 1II.B.2.b (describing spectrum which can be used to determine
whether use of celebrity's likeness is violative of celebrity's right of publicity).
123. See infra part III.B.1.
124. See infra part III.B.2.a.i; see e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Prods., 230 F. Supp. 721 (N.D.
If. 1964).
125. See supra note 65 (defining collateral product).
126. See infra part III.B.2.a.ii.
127. See infra part 1II.B.2.b.
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1. A literal application of the statutes
When evaluating the statutes regarding traditional rights of
piblicity and those regarding postmortem rights of publicity, the
subtle difference in each case creates the possibility that the law may
differ depending on whether the celebrity whose likeness has been
appropriated for the animated feature is alive or deceased.
a. the alive-and-well actor
Generally statutory rights of publicity doctrines preclude the
appropriation of one's likeness, name, or voice. Since the computer-
animated version of a personality is a likeness and the synthesized or
imitated voice is considered the voice of the personality, then it is
accurate to seek protection under the right of publicity against the
unauthorized appropriation of a celebrity's persona." A straight,
literal read precludes computer-animated cloning. 29
b. the actor six-feet-under
Assuming that a computer-animated image of the late actor is a
likeness and the synthesized voice, or human imitation, is considered
the voice of the late actor, and further assuming the postmortem right
of publicity has not terminated, there remains the question of whether
the unlicensed exploitation of a deceased actor in a postmortem film
is proscribed by existing postmortem statutes and common law.'30
In California, the postmortem right of publicity statute was
enacted despite First Amendment concerns voiced by the American
Civil Liberties Union and other interested parties. 3' However, in
response to their concerns, it was enacted with the following caveat:
"This section shall not apply to the use of a deceased personality's
name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any of the
following instances: ... [a] play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical
composition, film, radio or television program other than an advertise-
ment .... 32
128. See infra part III.B.l.b.
129. See Beard, supra note 13, at 146 (assuming that all forms of reanimation without
consent of a live celebrity are prohibited based upon statutory interpretation).
130. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing ways in which various states
have handled issue of postmortem protection).
131. See infra part IV.A.2.b (discussing First Amendment).
132. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(n)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
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Oklahoma, Texas, and Nevada, for example, have adopted
similarly worded statutes.133  The drafters of these exclusions
intended to prevent the postmortem right of publicity from suppress-
ing stories about the celebrity, or stories in which the celebrity played
some role in real life."3 However, such an exemption was unneces-
sary, in that even without the exemption, where a living personality's
likeness was appropriated for purposes of a biography, the courts
have held generally that the First Amendment right to free speech
outweighs the individual's right of publicity.35 Nonetheless, as
currently drafted, the postmortem statutes of California, Nevada,
Oklahoma, and Texas appear to expressly permit the unlicensed use
of a reanimated deceased actor in a creative medium like film.
36
2. Interpretation of cases
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "[o]ne who
appropriates for his own use or benefit the name or likeness of
another is subject to liability to the other."'37 "The cases in this
area have turned on such factors as whether the event reported was
predominately commercial or of news or historic value.'13  There
is no common-law precedent, however, for a situation in which a
character is portrayed by a celebrity's likeness in a dramatic work
which is neither biographical nor historical in nature. In a situation
like this, a decision must be born out of analogizing current case law.
A quagmire of confusing and conflicting court decisions has been
created.139 .The inconsistencies have opened the door for arguments
on either side of the assertion that appropriation of a personality's
likeness in the form of a computer-animated replica to be exploited
in a film is a violation of the right of publicity.
If one adopts the policy that re-animation should be governed by post-mortem
rights of publicity, then states with statutes similar to California must amend the
exclusion of film from the post-mortem statute so as to exclude from the
exclusion "re-animation" or, as Sam Goldwyn once so colorfully put it:
"Include me out."
Beard, supra note 13, at 157 n.280.
133. NEV. REV. STAT. § 598.984 (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1448(N) (West
1985); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.012(a)(1) (West 1987).
134. Beard, supra note 13, at 158.
135. See infra part IV.A.2.b (discussing First Amendment).
136. Beard, supra note 13, at 158.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
138. Tellado v. Time-Life Books, 643 F. Supp. 904, 908 (D.NJ. 1986).
139. See infra part III.B.2.
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The arguments generally hinge on interpretation. The law may
be viewed as either providing a "black and white approach"" or a
more unpredictable "spectrum approach"' 4 which may be used in
order to analyze the legalities of reanimation.
a. black & white approach
As illustrated above, courts are not at all sympathetic to the
unlicensed advertiser. On the other hand, courts have been extremely
lenient regarding appropriation for use in a biography or history
piece.4 But the question remains: If the filni is neither about the
celebrity, nor for purposes of advertising a product, is the use of the
personality's likeness a violation?
i. appropriation is a violation unless used to inform
It is possible to assert that only those works which are biographi-
cal or historical in nature are nonviolative forums for likeness
appropriation. While one who is a celebrity, or is an otherwise-
newsworthy personality, may be the proper subject of informative
presentations, such as news or a biography, the privilege does not
extend to the exploitation of his persona through a form of treatment
"distinct from the dissemination of news or information."'143 "From
a review of the authorities," using the likeness of a celebrity for
purposes other than the dissemination of "news or articles or
biographies" constitutes a violation of the right of publicity.'"
Following this interpretation, appropriating an actor's likeness for use
in a narrative work of pure fiction would be a violation; only a
biographical narrative work about that particular celebrity would be
nonviolative 45
However, authority exists suggesting that the right of publicity
may be much less protective, in that a violation may be found only
140. See infra part III.B.2.a.
141. See infra part III.B.2.b.
142. See infra part III.B.2.a.ii-b.ii.
143. Tellado, 643 F. Supp. at 909 (citing Gautier v. Pro-Football, 107 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y.
1986)); see also Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 838 F. Supp. 1501,1511
(N.D. Okla. 1993) ("The right of publicity has developed to protect the commercial
interest of celebrities in their identities.").
144. Tellado, 643 F. Supp. at 909 (quoting Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., 232 A.2d 458,
462 (NJ. 1967)).
145. See, eg., Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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where the use is for a commercial purpose-any other use may not be
violative."4
I. appropriation is not a violation unless used for a
commercial purpose
To determine if a violation of the right of publicity has occurred,
often the focus of the analysis is solely whether the use was a purely
commercial one.47 The concept of commercial use, however, has
"present[ed] significant problems because no uniform definition of
'commercial use' has emerged from the case law."1" For example,
in Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Association149 the
court found that it was a violation to place a caricature"5 of a
baseball player on baseball cards, considering any profiteering from
recognizable likenesses as an exercise of commercial purpose and,
thus, a violation of the right of publicity.5' In Paulsen v. Personali-
ty Posters, Inc.,52 however, the court held that since the celebrity's
likeness that appeared on a satirical poster was not being used to
endorse or sell a product, its use was not considered a commercial
purpose.153 In other words, the hopes of earning a profit from
selling a caricature did not constitute a commercial purpose, unless
the caricature was used to endorse or market a collateral product."
146. See infra part III.B.2.b.ii.
147. See Beard, supra note 13, at 160.
148. Cardtoons, 838 F. Supp. at 1515 (quoting James Barr Haines, First Amendment 11:
Developments in the Right of Publicity, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211 (1990)).
149. 838 F. Supp. 1501 (N.D. Okla. 1993).
150. The parties stipulated that the baseball cards at issue depicting major league
baseball players were "as a matter of fact, 'parodies' of the players they depict[ed]." Ild.
at 1508 (emphasis omitted).
151. Id. at 1510-11. The court noted that use of one's identity in connection with "news
[or] public affairs" would not constitute a violation. Id. at 1513; see also Grant v. Esquire,
367 F. Supp. 876, 880-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (suggesting that if defendant had used plaintiff's
picture "merely to attract attention" then the use would have been for purposes of
commercial trade and thus violative of the right of publicity).
152. 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
153. Id. at 508. Cardtoons inaccurately interprets the Paulsen holding as protecting
political speech-also known as news-in an attempt to distinguish the case and justify its
own contrary decision. Cardtoons, 838 F. Supp. at 1513. In fact, the court in Paulsen
found it was not necessary to evaluate the posters as political speech because it had
already determined that there was no violation which needed a political speech defense.
Paulsen, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 508 (holding that the use should not be considered a violation
whether it "be ... social criticism or pure entertainment").
154. Paulsen, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 508; see also supra note 65 (defining collateral product).
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"Appropriation of name or likeness generally becomes actionable
when used 'to advertise the defendant's business or product, or for
some similar commercial purpose."' 155 Courts have defined celebri-
ties' names and likenesses as things of value because they have been
appropriated for the commercial benefit of the vendor. 6 Similarly,
"courts have concluded that the value of the right of publicity lies in
the association between celebrity and product."' 5 7  Following, a
celebrity's persona has not been used for a commercial purpose where
the persona appears in the context of a narrative feature film; the
purpose of such a use is not to endorse a collateral product, but
rather to construct a story.
Profiting from featuring a celebrity's likeness in a dramatic,
fictional work does not constitute the commercial benefit with which
the right of publicity is concerned."8 A producer's motive to profit
from employing a celebrity's computer-generated clone does not alone
constitute a commercial purpose, "as many nontortious uses of
someone's likeness result in profits for their promoters." '159 To be
nonviolative, the use must be primarily of public interest-a rubric
under which news, biographies, and history fall. 6 Arguably, any
exploitation of a personality in a dramatic work in which the creator
has chosen, for artistic reasons, to use the likeness of a particular
celebrity is in the public's best interest in that such use is an example
of free expression.161 For example, according to the court in Estate
of Presley v. Russen,162 the purpose of the portrayal in question must
be examined to determine if it serves a social function valued by the
155. Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432,437 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b).
156. E.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 920 (3d Cir. 1994).
157. Id. at 919.
158. Contrast the assertion here under the "black and white" approach-if there is no
commercial purpose then there is no violation-with the assertion made under the
"spectrum" approach, see infra part III.B.2.b-some noncommercial uses are a violation
while others are not.
159. Tellado, 643 F. Supp. at 910.
160. Id.
161. The scope of the subject matter which may be considered of 'public interest'
or 'newsworthy' has been defined in most liberal and far reaching terms. The
privilege of enlightening the public is by no means limited to dissemination of
news in the sense of current events but extends far beyond to include all types
of factual, educational and historical data, or even entertainment and amusement,
concerning interesting phases of human activity in general.
Paulsen, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 506 (emphasis added).
162. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.NJ. 1981).
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protection of free speech.'6 "If the portrayal mainly serves the
purpose of contributing information .. . or of providing the free
expression of creative talent which contributes to society's cultural
enrichment, then the portrayal generally will be immune from
liability."' ' 4 It is arguable that all narrative works fall within this
purview.
Similarly, in Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc.," New York's
Appellate Division permitted the appropriation of a celebrity's
likeness so long as the use was not "simply a disguised commercial
advertisement for the sale of goods or services."' 66  The Second
Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi67 followed the same logic, determining
that the appropriation of Ginger Rogers's name in the title of a novel,
which was not about her, was not a violation of the right of publicity.
The court reached this conclusion since her name was used in a
literary, dramatic setting and not for the purpose of selling or
promoting a product."6 Rather, the court found the author was
exercising creative license by deciding that the name was an appropri-
ate choice for part of the title.
169
It is not necessarily considered a commercial purpose to use a
likeness in order to endorse a film in which the likeness appears170
In other words, if the synthespian-the reanimated version of a
celebrity-plays a significant role in the feature, and the synthespian's
likeness is used to promote the film, there may be no infringement,
whereas if the synthespian held merely a cameo role, the use of the
likeness to endorse the film would perhaps be an infringement.'
In the recent case of Matthews v. Wozencraft," Matthews's
likeness was depicted' first in a novel and then in the film version,
163. Id at 1356.
164. Id (emphasis added); cf Cardtoons, 838 F. Supp. at 1512 (illustrating confusion
by inferring that term "public affairs" does not include artistic expression).
165. 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (App. Div. 1980).
166. lId at 829.
167. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
168. Id at 1005.
169. Id. at 1004.
170. See Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1460-61 (9th Cir. 1994). "[C]ommercial
purpose means more than merely using a person's name as part of a cast of characters in
a television program advertisement that highlights the program's general plot." Id. at 1461.
171. But note that if the likeness is used merely to "attract consumers' attention and
provide a commercial advantage over [a] competitor," then the use may be considered to
be for a "commercial purpose." Id. (citing Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d
409, 421-22, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349-50 (1983)).
172. 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994).
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both entitled Rush.73 The story was a fictionalized version of an
event in which he played a significant role.' 4 In deciding there had
been no violation of Matthews's right of publicity, the court asserted
that "[i]t [was] immaterial whether Rush 'is viewed as an historical or
fictional work,'175 so long as it is not 'simply a disguised commercial
advertisement for the sale of goods or services."' 176  The court,
however, did concede that "there is no binding authority directly on
point." 77
The conclusion that use in advertising is the only violation may
be reached by examining the policy behind similar laws. The right of
publicity has been analogized to the Lanham Act. 78 The Act
ideally applies "only where the public interest in avoiding consumer
confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression."'
79
Courts have cited the only difference between the Lanham Act and
the right of publicity doctrine-aside from the fact that the former is
a federal statute and the latter is a state common-law or statutory
doctrine-is that the right of publicity doctrine is more expansive than
the Lanham Act because, unlike the Lanham Act, the right of
publicity does not require the likelihood of confusion.Y° Based on
this precedent, although deception is not required to assert a right of
publicity violation, the right of publicity may be implicated only when
the Lanham Act is implicated-where advertising or promotion is the
issue.
b. spectrum analysis approach
If a spectrum does exist, rather than the black or white approach-
es discussed above,' then where on the continuum does computer
cloning lie? A feature film starring an animated actor is neither a
purely commercial nor a purely news-oriented work. Rather, it falls
within the realm of literary and dramatic works. Whether it is
173. Id. at 436.
174. Note that this was considered a potential invasion of the right of publicity rather
than of privacy because Matthews had been converted into a public figure through the
events and subsequent publishing of the book.
175. Matthews, 15 F.3d at 440 (quoting Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1067 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978)).
176. Id. (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004 (quoting Frosch, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 829)).
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997, 999; see also supra part II.B.1.
179. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
180. Id- at 1003-04.
181. See supra part 1II.B (introducing notion of spectrum approach).
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considered a violative activity is contingent upon how it is perceived
in light of the following discussion.
i. is the cloned star's appearance in the film a "cultural"
contribution?
According to Midler, if the reanimation is "informative or
cultural" the use should be exempt from the right of publicity."8
However, if the use is merely "exploitative," or merely to attract
attention, a different conclusion should be drawn.1" What criteria
or standards should be used to distinguish between the permitted and
the proscribed? Professor Joseph Beard suggests:
[a]t one extreme might be situations where it is clear that
the ... star is being used only for exploitative purposes,
purposes that had minimal communicative content, for
example a brief cameo as a corpse on a slab. At the other
end of the spectrum would be the reanimated actor appear-
ing in his own, unfictionalized life story."8
If the reanimated personality has a significant role in the film, then
Professor Beard would argue that the exploitation is not a viola-
tion.' s
In Estate of Presley v. Russen86 the court found a violation of
the right of publicity in that the Big El Show,'s7 while a dramatic
work rather than an advertisement, "serve[d] primarily to commercial-
ly exploit the likeness of Elvis Presley without contributing anything
of substantial value to society."'" However, would the result have
been the same had the work in question been a narrative program
with a worthy storyline starring an Elvis impersonator? The fact that
the court qualifies its position by inferring that had the Big El Show
been of "substantial value to society"'" the decision would have
been different suggests that perhaps the court would have been more
lenient in the case of a narrative work.
182. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).
183. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
184. Beard, supra note 13, at 163.
185. Id
186. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.NJ. 198.1).
187. The Big El Show was a variety show often depicting skillful imitations of Elvis
Presley. Id. at 1348.




However, in order to accommodate First Amendment concerns,
courts have refused to extend the right of publicity to preclude the
use of a celebrity's persona in the text of a fictional or sernifictional
book or movie."9  In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Produc-
tions"' the nephew of the late Rudolph Valentino brought suit to
bar a fictional television broadcast of "Legend of Valentino: A
Romantic Fiction" as a violation of the star's right of publicity."9
Although the majority of the en banc California Supreme Court
rejected the claim on the ground that in this particular jurisdiction the
right of publicity is not descendible, Chief Justice Bird, writing for a
three-member concurrence, stated: "[P]rominence invites creative
comment. Surely, the range of free expression would be meaningfully
reduced if prominent persons in the present and recent past were
forbidden topics for the imaginations of authors of fiction."193 The
court noted that had the defendant published "Valentino's Cook-
book," which was comprised of recipes having no connection to
Rudolph Valentino, a cause of action may have existed. 94 The right
of publicity applied because the celebrity's likeness would be "wholly
unrelated" to the cookbook. 9 The court asserted that had the
name been used for the promotion or endorsement of a collateral
commercial product, the celebrity's right of publicity would have been
violated. 96 This reasoning is another illustration of the room for
creative interpretation created by courts' decisions. Chief Justice Bird
makes it clear that appropriating a celebrity's likeness for the purpose
of selling a collateral product is a violation; however, appropriating
that same likeness for use in a noncommercial setting is only a
violation where the likeness is "wholly unrelated" to the work in
190. See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Guglielmi v.
Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860,865-66,603 P,2d 454,458,160 Cal. Rptr. 352,356
(1979); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (App. Div. 1980); see also
James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories,
51 TEx. L. REV. 637, 655-60 (1973) (noting that courts focus on whether work is fictional
when determining if right of publicity has been violated).
191. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
192. Id. at 862, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
193. Id at 869, 603 P.2d at 460, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 358 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
194. Id. at 865 n.6, 603 P.2d at 457 n.6,160 Cal. Rptr. at 355 n.6 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
Note the similarity to the Rogers case, where the court held that to use Ginger Roger's
name in the title of a film was a creative use and thus not actionable. Rogers, 875 F.2d
at 994.
195. Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d at 865 n.6, 603 P.2d at 457 n.6, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 355 n.6
(Bird, C.J., concurring).
196. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring).
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which it is used.' 97 But what does the court mean by wholly unre-
lated? It has been defined as gratuitous use of the actor's likeness for
purposes of self-promotion, for instance a cameo computer-generated
Madonna.
ii. distinction between actor and character
Cases in which the imitation serves a story-telling role are, of
course, most closely analogous to the circumstances surrounding the
use of a reanimated actor in a narrative, feature film.' 98 Where an
advertisement or endorsement is not at issue-in other words, where
the appropriated likeness is found in a dramatic or literary context-a
distinction has been drawn by the courts between an actor and a
character created by that actor. This distinction adds to the artillery
of arguments, including those cited above, 99 from which an unau-
thorized appropriation may be deemed permissible. In Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures,2°° an unsuccessful suit was brought by Bela
Lugosi's widow and surviving son to recover profits made by the
defendant movie company in its licensing of the "Count Dracula"
character, portrayed by Lugosi in the 1930 film Dracula.20' In his
concurrence, Justice Mosk asserted that "[m]erely playing a role [such
as Bela Lugosi as Dracula] ... creates no ... property right in an
actor, absent a contract so providing. ', 21 "Where an actor plays a
well-defined part which has not become inextricably identified with his
own person, it has been suggested the actor receives no right of
exploitation in his portrayal of the character."2'
However, an actor could obtain proprietary interests in a screen
persona and, thus, be protected under the right of publicity with
regard to that persona where the character has become so associated
with the actor that it becomes inseparable from the actor's own public
image.' In other words, "[a]n original creation of a fictional figure
played exclusively by its creator may well be protectible. '2" This
197. Id. (Bird, CJ., concurring).
198. See cases cited infra note 206.
199. See supra part III.B.2.b (discussing Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339
(D.N.J. 1981)).
200. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
201. Id
202. Id at 825, 603 P.2d at 432, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 330 (Mosk, J., concurring).
203. McFarland, 14 F.3d at 920 (emphasis added).
204. Id.
205. Id. (quoting Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 825, 603 P.2d at 432, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 330
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line of reasoning has become popular?6 The "'basic and underly-
ing theory is that a person has the right to enjoy the fruits of his own
industry free from unjustified interference.'"" The actors are
being rewarded not for portraying themselves, but rather for creating
and cultivating their own charactersm '
To reward actors for their own natural personality, by protecting
their likeness, flies in the face of the above-illustrated intention of the
courts to reward actors for their effort and their contribution to the
character, aside from merely 'acting the role. Thus, if an actor's
likeness, which is not identified with a particular character, is
appropriated for the purposes of exploitation in an animated film, no
infringement has taken place because there is no proprietary interest
being violated.
C. Predictions
Despite the validity of any of the above arguments, the climate
of the courts on the right of publicity issue may determine which of
the above arguments will likely prevail. The courts have been
consistently expanding the reach of the right of publicity since its birth
in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.' in the early
1950s. Clearly the law affords more protection to the commercial
value of celebrity status21 now than at any previous time.21' A
(Mosk, J., concurring)).
206. See, e.g., Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 362, 371 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (enjoining look-alike's misappropriation of "schlemiel" persona of Woody Allen
cultivated in the film Annie Hall); Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F.
Supp. 485, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that the Marx Brothers had a protected property
right in on-screen images and actions), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982);
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding
comedy team Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy had common-law right of publicity in on-
screen images).
207. McFarland, 14 F.3d at 919 (quoting Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., 232 A.2d 458,
462 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967)).
208. Id. at 921.
209. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
210. Prosser states:
A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments,
fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession of calling which gives the
public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has
become a "public personage." He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to
be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of
reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a
professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is,
however, broader than this. It includes ... even ordinary soldiers . ... It
includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention
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clear example is the fact that, in many jurisdictions, celebrity personas
enjoy protection after-as well as during-life.
2 12
Recent cases further illustrate the significant expansion of the
right. For example, in Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets,
Inc.,1 3 Johnny Carson sought relief for the unauthorized use of the
phrase "Here's Johnny" in the marketing of a portable toilet.214
The court rejected the previously accepted contention that a common-
law right of publicity does not extend beyond an individual's actual
name and likeness, and found that there had been a violation of the
celebrity's right of publicity based on the fact that the familiar
introductory phrase conjures up images of the late-night talk show
host."1 5 Later, in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.216 the court expanded
upon Midler by holding that a "gravelly voice" which sounded "'like
how you'd sound if you drank a quart of bourbon, smoked a pack of
cigarettes and swallowed a pack of razor blades .... [l]ate at night"'
could be protected from imitating as long as it conjures up the image
of a specific celebrity-in this case, Tom Waits.2"7 Then Cardtoons
v. Major League Baseball Players Association2 ' included caricatures
in the expansive pot of violative likenesses, a further insult to the
First Amendment.2 9 These cases are extreme illustrations of the
extent to which the right of publicity will protect a personality.
This climate of favoring protection culminated in the much-
criticized recent decision in White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc' where the Ninth Circuit broadened the definition of likeness
to include virtually anything which would "evoke" the identity of a
is focused upon him as a person.
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 844-45 (3d ed. 1964)
(footnotes omitted).
211. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992)
(expanding "identity" to include dress and gestures that are characteristic of a celebrity),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988)
(expanding "likeness" to include voice-alikes); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets,
Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (expanding "likeness" to include phrases associated with
a celebrity).
212. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
213. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
214. Id. at 832-33.
215. Id. at 837.
216. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
217. Id. at 1097 (quoting a Tom Waits fan).
218. 838 F. Supp. 1501 (N.D. Okla. 1993).
219. Id. at 1511-12.
220. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
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celebrity. 2  There, when an appliance manufacturer depicted an
unnamed robot, dressed in a slinky gown, standing in front of a board
of letters, the court found that Vanna White's right of publicity had
been infringed.P But more importantly, these cases depict the
climate which seems to favor the individual celebrity rather than the
First Amendment and creative capitalism. Thus, it is likely that the
courts will continue their allegiance to the celebrities and, thereby,
find in favor of prohibiting the unauthorized use of a celebrity's
computer-generated likeness in a film when it is neither biographical
nor historical.
On the other hand, courts may be growing intolerant of this
beast-the right of publicity-which is growing in a confusing and
consuming manner. The doctrine has suffered much recent academic
criticism.P Recently the Third Circuit criticized the expansion of
the right by labeling the Carson decision as an "offensive" example
of the right's largess. 4 In addition, the Ninth Circuit did attempt
to temper the affect of its decision in Midler by warning "[w]e need
not and do not go so far as to hold that every imitation of a voice to
advertise merchandise is actionable."' New York, in fact, com-
pletely rejected extending the right of publicity to instances of sound-
alikes.
However, courts have primarily exercised their liberal interpreta-
tion of likeness only when the celebrity is being exploited in order to
sell or endorse a product; therefore, the courts may not necessarily
address the reanimated actor in the same way when the actor is
placed in a dramatic narrative such as a fictional film.
221. Id at 1399 (referring to the "identity" of Vanna White rather than her "likeness,"
but the effect is as if the two terms were synonymous).
222. Id The dissent aptly pointed out the fact that the most familiar image in the
commercial was the set of Wheel of Fortune rather than the image of Vanna White. Id
at 1405 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
223. See generally Kenneth E. Spahn, The Right of Publicity: A Matter of Privacy,
Property, or Public Domain? 19 NOVA L. REV. 1013 (1995) (commenting on right of
publicity's unclear definition); Felcher & Rubin, supra note 110 (criticizing right of
publicity as confusing).
224. McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 920 (3d Cir. 1994).
225. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
226. Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826,838 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(commenting on Midler, 849 F.2d 460).
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IV. OPPOSING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY'S PROTECTION
The invasive and eerie nature of the activity, coupled with the
current expansionist climate regarding the right of publicity, indicates
that the right of publicity may preclude reanimation for the purpose
of starring a celebrity's likeness in a film.' However, the right of
publicity doctrine is a vague and murky body of law, and the
ambiguity of precedent opens the door for permitting the unautho-
rized cloning of a personality.' In fact, reanimating celebrities for
feature films should not be prohibited by the right of publicity.
It must be noted that the right of publicity was created prior to
the development of the current state of technology, which includes the
potential ability to reanimate. The entertainment industry has
developed significantly as a result of technology.29 The doctrine
was not necessarily intended to deal with the situations which have
arisen out of the industry's technological maturity.210
Although the courts have legal authority to support a finding that
CGI appropriation does not run afoul of a celebrity's right of
publicity, the courts will probably decide that it is a violation because
the conduct would otherwise go without remedy."' The doctrine of
the right of publicity, however, should not be applied because its
application will have negative repercussions. Rather, a compulsory
licensing scheme 22 should be erected to contend with the issue of
reanimation for noncommercial purposes. Dramatic narratives,
including feature films, should be included in this definition of
noncommercial.
The restrictive nature of the right of publicity should be
contained. At least to the extent that the celebrity's likeness is
appropriated for use in a dramatic, noncommercial setting, the right
of publicity should not be prohibit appropriation. The reasons include
227. See supra part III.C.
228. See supra part III.A.
229. See, eg., Digital Domain, Dreaming With Your Eyes Wide Open (Nov. 1995)
(copy on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); see also supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
230. See Nimmer, supra note 103, at 203-04; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652A cmt. c (1977).
231. See supra part III.A.
232. See infra part V.B. A compulsory license is a license "created under the Copyright
Act to allow certain parties to make certain uses of copyrighted material without the
explicit permission of the copyright owner, on payment of specified royalty." BLACK'S
LAW DICIONARY 288 (6th ed. 1990).
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the following: (1) the doctrine suffers from inherent problems in that
it conflicts with federal and state laws as well as the United States
Constitution which, at the very least, justifies preventing its expansion,
if not doing away with it completely 3 (2) the doctrine's prohibition
in the case of reanimation would provide the celebrity with an
obscene windfall; and (3) the doctrine's prohibition with regard
to computer animation will tempt many to litigate with every new
technological advance 5
A. Inherent Conflict
1. Clashing with federal and state laws
The right of publicity has been violated as a result of depicting
a personality's face, 1 6 style of dress,"'7 mannerism, 8 and distinc-
tive voice, for example. 9  These elements, while recognizable
characteristics of particular celebrities, are also distinct facts.' ° The
issue is who has the right to control the exploitation of these facts.
A public figure does not have the right to control the dissemination
of information; by virtue of the public figure's status, the public figure
has in essence become news.24' The problem is that, by definition,
the facts that make up one's likeness, and are thus unavailable to
exploit according to the right of publicity, are the same facts that
comprise "information" available for all to exploit under the right to
privacy and copyright laws. 42 This conflict merits resolution.
233. See infra part IV.A.
234. See infra part IV.B.
235. See infra part IV.C.
236. E.g., National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 537 (W.D.
Tex. 1980).
237. E.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992), cerL
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
238. E.g., id.
239. E.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Midler
v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), for the proposition that a "voice is
as distinctive and personal as a face" (emphasis omitted)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047
(1993).
240. Beard, supra note 13, at 143.
241. See Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, 769 F.2d 1128,1139 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1094 (1986); see also Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447,451-52 (3d Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 921 (1958).
242. Paulsen v. Personality Poster, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 507 (Sup. Ct. 1968)
(suggesting celebrity status makes celebrities "news").
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2. Running roughshod over the Constitution
a. preemption
The right of publicity doctrine is worthy of much criticism in that
it conflicts with the goals of the United States Constitution. Congress
has created copyright law243 and trademark law2" to provide pro-
tection for intangible property. Congress has set standards for
obtaining such protection. For example, to earn copyright protection
material must be original, fixed, and creative;245 to obtain a trade-
mark it must carry, a secondary meaning such that the public
associates it with the sale of something.246 Likewise, Congress has
established a set of criteria which constitute a violation or infringe-
ment of copyright and trademark protection. 47 There are gaps of
noncoverage as a result of Congress's purposeful specificity.248
With the advent of right of publicity law, federal statutory
intellectual property law is being preempted. 4 The right of publici-
ty offers protection of celebrity personas-protection which was
contemplated, but denied by Congress. Thus, the courts have run
counter to the scheme set up by Congress-the body given the
constitutional charge of this area.' For this reason, rights of
publicity law should be subjected to severe scrutiny.
b. First Amendment
The right of publicity is in direct opposition to the First Amend-
ment. 1  The right of publicity, whether tied to name, likeness,
243. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).
244. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
245. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
246. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1054.
247. See supra part II.A-B.1.
248. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). "[A]spects of a person ... [such as] name, likeness,
characteristics and life history... are excluded from copyright protection by... statute."
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 110, at 1578 n.11.
249. The court in Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 838 F. Supp. 1501,
1516-19 (N.D. Okla. 1993), recognized that parody is a defense to trademark and copyright
infringements and acknowledged that parody has been considered a form of artistic
expression protected by the First Amendment. Nevertheless, the court decided that
parody is not a defense to a right of a publicity violation. Id. at 1519-21.
250. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 8.
251. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 110, at 1590 (discussing First Amendment's effect
on development of right of publicity).
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achievements, or any other identifying characteristics conflicts with
the expressive interests of others5 2  Society's interest in free
expression must be balanced against the interests of an individual
seeking protection in the right of publicity where the right is being
expanded beyond established limits.5' This call for balancing is
merely a euphemistic way to acknowledge the inherent conflict
between the First Amendment and the doctrine of the right of
publicity.
B. Windfall
As Cindy prepared to enter the cylindrical scanner, the technician
attempted to ease her nerves.:4
"I assure you there's nothing to worry about."
"Yah? Does it hurt?"
"No. It's completely painless."
"And I get two-hundred thousand dollars a year?"
"That's the standard modeling fee."
"And I don't have to do anything?"
"Not once the model is made."
"Seems like an awful lot."
"It's because of who you are""
In fact, it does seem like an "awful lot" for simply enduring a
couple of moments within the scanner. The above is an illustration
of the following concern: Several decades ago a celebrity attained
fame and profits by performing on stage for an isolated audience.56
Years later, a celebrity expounds the same energy yet makes a
significantly greater profit delivering a performance on a set which is
then broadcast to thousands-perhaps millions--of viewers. 7
Present day, a celebrity-exerting no more energy than originally, yet
making an even greater profit-delivers a performance which is then
broadcast, video-taped, filmed, placed onto CD-ROM (read-only
252. Id.
253. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977)
(exemplifying Court's struggle with First Amendment issue).
254. LOOKER, supra note 1 (describing scene in film).
255. Id. (quoting dialogue from scene in film).
256. PRINDLE, supra note 117, at 204 (asserting that the "stage is the actor's medium"
and that technological advancements in the film industry have had a negative impact on
the nature of acting).
257. See id. at 90 (detailing technology's effect on actors).
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memory), and so on.25' It is the advancing technology rather than
the increased efforts of the performer which create the worth of the
celebrity 9 This could be considered a great windfall.
When the right of publicity was originally applied to preclude
others from profiting from a celebrity's fame, it served as an
acknowledgment that a persona was worth money and that the
celebrity carrying the persona deserved to profit from it more than
those attempting to sell a product because, of the two, the celebrity
expounded more energy in establishing the value of her persona.2
However, in the reanimation scenario,261 the celebrity is not the one,
of those implicated, who is expounding the most energy. There are
filmmakers, animators, and computer programmers, for example, all
of whom are exerting effort to create a piece of entertainment, and
thus the celebrity should not be granted the windfall. The right of
publicity, if applied, would provide celebrities with this extraordinary
windfall, which runs counter to the original rationale behind the
doctrine.262
Historically the right of publicity was created to acknowledge the
star system which was developing as a result of rapid technological
advancements in the media. Celebrities were being created and thus
becoming valuable commodities. 2 ' But at its inception in the early
1950s, did this doctrine contemplate the worth of a celebrity in a
technically advanced world of multimedia? "The right of publicity
serves both individual and societal interests by preventing what our
legal tradition regards as wrongful conduct: unjust enrichment and
deceptive trade practices. ''2' However, the celebrity has already
been enriched by virtue of whatever performance(s) resulted in her
fame and by virtue of the property rights which she undoubtedly has
258. See id.
259. See Nimmer, supra note 103, at 203-04 and accompanying text (crediting advancing
technology with providing celebrities with pecuniary worth "undreamed of at the turn of
the century").
260. Haelan Lab. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866,868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 816 (1953) (setting precedent by recognizing that ball player should be able to
earn money from his persona).
261. See supra part I (introducing issue of reanimating a live celebrity for purpose of
employing celebrity in narrative film).
262. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
263. See Nimmer, supra note 103 and accompanying text.
264. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 838 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Cornelia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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in her persona with regard to advertising and endorsements.26 In
the case of a CGI replica, the original celebrity has expended
absolutely no effort or time in terms of creating the simulated
performance; thus, the celebrity is not deserving of any compensa-
tion.2 Will someone else be profiting? Yes, everyone involved in
the film and the creation of the computer program that simulates
human movement-all deserving of compensation because of their
expended effort-will be profiting.
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. the. Supreme
Court stated that a mechanism to vindicate an individual's economic
rights is indicated where the appropriated thing is "the product of...
[the individual's] own talents and energy, the end result of much time,
effort and expense."'2 67 However, is the popularity of an actor the
result of that particular actor's time, effort, and expense exclusively?
Probably not. The producer, director, manager, agent, and studio
play a role in the success of an actor.2  Is the celebrity really
responsible for her own fame, or is the film and television industries'
ability to exploit talent through all technological options the reason
for the scope and worth of a celebrity's fame? If the latter is
responsible, doesn't the right of publicity bestow an undeserving
windfall upon the celebrity-a circumstance which is in direct
opposition with one of the original policies behind the right of
publicity?
C. Inviting Litigation
By allowing the right of publicity to hover over every situation
born out of the newest technological creation, the courts will be
bombarded with questions of first impression and will be forced to
contend with them in light of a doctrine which itself is already
confused and ambiguous. 69 This will also have a chilling effect on
265. See supra part III (depicting the unlicensed use of a celebrity for a commercial
purpose as a definite violation of the right of publicity).
266. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 443 U.S. 562, 575 (1977).
267. Id
268. NINA BLANCHARD, How TO BREAK INTO MOTION PICTURES, TELEVISION,
COMMERCIALS & MODELING 120 (1978).
269. There is a current case in which a greeting card company is being sued by
Humphrey Bogart's estate for using the phrase "happy birthday, sweetheart" which
conjures up the image of the deceased Bogart. Jeff Barge, Deceased Stars Haunting the
Courtroom, A.B.A. J., May 1995, at 33, 33. Stuart Sinder of New York's Kenyon &
Kenyon, representing the greeting card company, notes that, "although the law on the
issue is hazy . ... '[it] is an interesting ease of first impression.'" Id. This situation is
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artistic expression and possibly on the incentive to advance technolog-
ically in the entertainment industry. Difficult questions arise as a
natural extension of coverage by the right of publicity. This can of
worms further illustrates the impending mounds of litigation: Even
if the right of publicity did apply and preclude reanimation without
consent, would it apply to a mutated likeness? For example, would
it preclude combining Arnold Schwarzenneger's body with Mick
Jagger's face? Would it prohibit taking years off Drew Barrymore
and giving her pigtails again or aging her by adding wrinkles and a
few pounds around the middle? If it did provide protection in these
instances as well, the windfall is compounded exponentially by the
fact that celebrities not only control their own likenesses for the
present moment but for every moment past or forthcoming.27
Protection over mutated versions of one's likeness is even more of an
affront to the senses in that many of the concerns over cloning an
exact replica do not exist: no possible confusion, no market satura-
tion problem, no competition problem.
V. PROPOSAL
A. Problems If No Protection Exists
Suspend disbelief and assume for a moment that the right of
publicity will be applied in a manner such that featuring a celebrity's
computerized clone in a film is not a violation. Although the
previously-mentioned problems would no longer exist, glaring
problems would exist which would demand regulation.
For example, the celebrity will have no right to her animated
image; but the computer programmer, or someone else, can hold the
rights to the tangible program.27 This has the flavor of injustice;
similar to Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983), in
that the phrase is what "conjures" the identity of the celebrity; it is distinguishable,
however, in that the phrase here is not used solely to market a product, but rather is the
creative fodder for the product itself.
270. See, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1994) (regarding George
McFarland's likeness as a child, rather than as a 64-year-old man-his age when he
initiated the action).
271. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to speak on these issues, the
consensus of lower court opinions is that programs are copyrightable subject
matter, and that copyright extends both to source code and object code of
application programs and system programs. Also, a chip or diskette embodying
code constitutes a copy. Moreover, program design and architecture are also
within the ambit of copyright.
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someone other than the celebrity herself dictates the integrity of the
celebrity's likeness in that the activities of the likeness are controlled
by whomever legally controls the computer program).2 Although
there are other doctrines of law which may address this problem,273
the lack of right of publicity protection would be an invitation to
appropriate nonetheless. Additionally, without any protection, the
celebrity's likeness will most definitely be exploited financially.
Tempting red doors are opened. There is a potential for pornography
to become a popular arena for synthespians-naughty nude images of
celebrities who otherwise would absolutely refuse to be caught on film
garbless. There are serious moral implications here which must be
weighed against the First Amendment.74 However, this balancing
problem is not unique to the reanimation scenario: Whenever
pornography is an issue, a common society-wide moral rears its head
and shakes it in disgust. 75
B. Compulsory Licensing Scheme
A compulsory licensing scheme276 would enable celebrities to
retain some rights in their persona, but preclude them from retaining
all rights;2 it is a perfect compromise between celebrities and the
industry which created them.278 Compulsory licensing would address
2 INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY, supra note 48, § 11.03[2][a].
272. See id
273. "A significant number of states have anti-dilution statutes . ... One form of
dilution is 'tarnishment,' a use by the defendant of plaintiff's [likeness] 'in an unwholesome
or degrading context,' or 'out-of-keeping with plaintiff's high quality image."' Beard,
supra note 13, at 178. "Dilution arguments based on a 'quality and prestige' argument
might be raised against a reanimator because the quality of the synthetic actor is poor."
Id. at 179. However, "[d]efendants have been successful in defeating trademark
infringement or dilution claims based on First Amendment considerations." Id. at 180.
For a description of other doctrines which threaten to protect celebrities, see supra part
II.
274. See supra part IV.A.2.b. (discussing the First Amendment).
275. For example, in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467
F. Supp. 366,374 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court based its decision in favor of the plaintiff on
the fact that "[olccasionally the misappropriation of a mark is used in connection with
goods or services which the customers of the true owner of the mark would find
repugnant. This presents a special threat to the good name and goodwill of the true
owner."
276. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
277. The imposition of licensing schemes in copyright law is exemplary of this proposed
solution. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1994) (cable systems); id. § 111(a)(4), 119(b) (satellite);
id. § 115 (music publishing); id. § 118 (public television).
278. Such a scheme enables each party involved to profit from their investment in the
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the concerns regarding the right of publicity as well as the concerns
regarding a complete lack of protection.279 The proposition is not
extraordinary; Congress has not been adverse to addressing technolog-
ical advancements in entertainment by imposing compulsory licensing
schemes.m
1. Suggested scheme
Personalities must license their likeness to those who request it;
however, they will be compensated by a statutorily determined
figure."' Their likenesses may be licensed on a per use basis.'
Personalities will not be forced to accept every request, which could
result in glutting the market with their likeness; however, there will
be a statutory minimum requirement of acceptances.' Those who
create the programs may copyright them.' 4 However, it will not be
possible to obtain the exclusive rights to the celebrity's likeness.285
2. Policy: justification for the scheme
The effect of refusing to apply the right of publicity to the use of
CGI in feature films and enacting a compulsory scheme instead, will
have a positive effect upon society and the celebrities as well.
star system proportionally rather than have the money pile up in the celebrities' corner
while they figuratively file their nails.
279. See supra part V.A.
280. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994)
(compensating the industry for the loss in prerecorded sales anticipated from the
introduction of digital-audio technology to the market).
281. For example, the current compulsory license rate for music publishers is $.0625 per
recording for records. This aspect of the scheme prevents the unfair windfall which is a
result of bidding wars. However, the amount will be a scientific figure proportionate to
the celebrity's worth-for example, an equation based on the film's gross receipts.
282. A celebrity's persona may be licensed for one particular film-use-at a time.
283. The ability to refuse will enable the celebrity to be somewhat selective, and
thereby maintain some control over his or her likeness. A specified number of required
acceptances will be set forth in the statute-for example, one project per month or twelve
per year-if offers are extended.
284. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
285. Therefore, owners of copyrighted programs do not have to allow their programs
to be copied, but no one else is precluded from creating their own.
Also, exclusive rights would run counter to the purpose of the scheme in that they
would create a competitive, bidding-war situation. Further, to allow exclusive licensing
would enable celebrities to maintain complete control over their personas by licensing
solely to themselves through a shell agent of some sort.
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a. where the wind blows
The receipt of the windfall would not be unjust if the entire
benefit were not bestowed upon the celebrity, but rather distributed
along par with the effort the celebrity has expended in nurturing his
or her career. In return for their forfeiture, celebrities will have a
persona which represents every moment of their life, and each
persona may be for sale 6 In those jurisdictions which recognize
a postmortem right of publicity, 7 celebrities will be able to make
an additional profit by selling postmortem rights before they die."
b. some semblance of control remains
To rationalize the loss of control this scheme imposes upon the
celebrity, two points must be highlighted. First, the celebrity had
virtually no control over his persona pre-Haelan. After which
point the law intended only to bestow such protection upon the
celebrity in the face of commercial profiteering.2 Second, even in
the contemporary ideal situation for the celebrity-where the celebrity
has dictated the terms of the performance contract, is enjoying the
benefits of bargaining, and is actually performing himself-his control
is illusory.291 So his loss of control under the compulsory licensing
scheme, in fact, is not so dramatic.
c. preserving the star system and avoiding virtual reality
Employing a computer licensing scheme rather than precluding
the activity through the right of publicity will prevent the demise of
the star system. To prevent the actor from ultimately being replaced
by an original computer-generated movie star,' the actor must be
willing for his or her own likeness to be generated. If in fact an
286. A licensee may seek a license to use the likeness of a particular celebrity as they
appeared 20 years prior to the date of the compulsory licensing agreement.
287. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
288. Himelstein, supra note 9, at 6 (quoting Professor Joseph J. Beard).
289. Haelan Lab. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 346
U.S. 816 (1953); see infra part III.A.
290. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868 (recognizing that "prominent persons . .. would feel sorely
deprived" if they did not receive money for authorizing the use of their personas in
advertising).
291. PRINDLE, supra note 17, at 214.
292. Sotor, supra note 6, at 28 (" 'You now have the freedom to construct a character
that doesn't exist and make [it] three-dimensionally real.'" (quoting Mark Dippe, visual
effects supervisor at ILM)); see infra note 296.
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actor's likeness is used rather than a fictional character then the actor
will remain valuable.' 9 If this effort is not mandatory, however, it
will fail. Without compulsory licensing, when celebrities are asked to
license their likeness for use in narrative works, they will inevitably
and understandably attempt to get the most money for their im-
age,2 9' will lack the foresight to see the ramifications such stubborn-
ness will have on the future of the star system as a whole. Because
in effect, if the actor's demands are met, reanimating the live actor
will no longer be a cost-efficient option for the filmmaker and the
filmmaker will default to the logical alternative-an original creation
of an animated human being, resembling no one in particular.295
Does that mean human talent will be excluded from the virtual reality
star system?296 Compulsory licensing forces the existence of a
connection between virtual reality and actual reality which will enable
actual celebrities to maintain some value and thus ultimately their
jobs."l Otherwise, actual actors may only find jobs imitating
animated personalities.
VI. CONCLUSION: A WARNING
The future: As anticipated, the law stretched the right of
publicity over dramatic works like a blanket, prohibiting any
appropriation without consent. Television mega-station; long
corridors; the buzz and glow of technology. The haggard wizards
fiddle with the computers and controls and suck down troughs of
coffee. They smoke and chat and hitch up their outdated corduroys.
They manipulate beautiful images of bubbly, blonde-haired, hard-
293. PRINDLE, supra note 17, at 13 (crediting actors as an ingredient necessary to
financing a film project).
294. BLANCHARD, supra note 268, at 117 (describing the art of bargaining). A good
agent, negotiating on behalf of the actor, "will try to get every last penny for the job as
well as the best contract and billing conditions." Id
295. See Rose, supra note 7, at R8 (describing entertainment industry's desire to create
computer-animated actors-synthespians). So if it is legally impermissible to create
synthespians who resemble celebrities, then the industry will be compelled to create a
computer-animated star system. See id ("Hollywood's many worriers project an
exponential swelling in the ranks of unemployed actors.").
296. Koseluck, supra note 7, at 33 (acknowledging the actor's struggle to remain a
necessary element in Hollywood in light of rapidly developing technology).
297. The industry's practice of employing actual celebrities in interactive media rather
than creating original life-like characters is an illustration of Hollywood's desire to
maintain the connection between reality and virtual reality. See id. "It was only when
digital video was a reality and the ability to bring to the medium the big-screen quality of
star talent that things really start to happen." Id
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bodied, two-dimensional synthespians. This virtual reality is carried
over the airwaves to an appreciative audience separated by walls of
stucco, but laughing and clapping in unison. Outside the television
station a thin, crusty fellow recites Shakespeare in a raspy voice while
a dirty hat rests at his feet in which two pennies, an expired credit
card and a subway token sit. The streets are empty and grey.
Windows are aglow with the blue flicker of entertainment.
Pamela Lynn Kunath*
* Thanks to the Coven for supporting me and making me laugh and to my non-law
school friends, especially Kerry Prior, for still speaking to me. Special thanks to the
editors and staff of Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their effort and patience.
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